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## WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ST. PETERSBURG: BERLIN: WASHINGTON.

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LONDON, *February, 1905.*

THERE is an interest attaching to a fresh session of the British Parliament such as the American Congress, I am told, can never command. Congress makes laws. Parliament not only makes laws but unmakes governments; and it is the ever-present chance that the latter prerogative may be enforced that makes the House of Commons so full of dramatic possibilities and human attractiveness. That attractiveness is still felt, in spite of the steady and progressive decline of Parliament in popular respect and (it is not too much to say) in popular confidence. Within the last twenty years, the attitude not only of the people but of Members of Parliament towards the House of Commons has unmistakably changed. To be a Member of Parliament is still an honor, but not the honor it was. It is a claim to consideration, where it used to be a claim to distinction. It carries with it a position, but the position has been robbed of much of its old prestige. It is a commonplace of English politics that the people no longer read Parliamentary debates. The political instruction of the nation is carried on outside the walls of the House of Commons. Men still look to Members of Parliament for guidance, and guidance is abundantly supplied to them—I know of no country where the average citizen has more or better opportunities of hearing both sides—but it is not from the Front Bench at Westminster, but from the platform at huge popular meetings, as a sort of perambulating lecturer on politics, that the rising statesman, and even the statesman who has already risen, now addresses the country. Again, Parliament nowadays has to compete for popular interest with a new and multiplying host of minor assemblies. There has been within the last twenty years

a vast extension of local government in England. County Councils, Borough Councils and municipalities have not only increased in numbers, but have quintupled their activities. Men who prefer the reality of power to its semblance and its appanages find a readier scope for their energies, can really achieve more, and, above all, can see their achievements bear immediate fruit, if, instead of entering Parliament, they throw themselves into the work of local administration. The sphere is smaller, but its opportunities are more individual; and its duties, as Lord Rosebery has often insisted, at least as interesting and far more intimately related to the welfare of society. But, though a beginning has been made with decentralization, the pressure and the complexities of public business remain more formidable than ever. The widening sphere of local activities has been more than counterbalanced by the growth and insistency of national and Imperial affairs; and the plain fact that Parliament can no longer do its work, that it is hopelessly overburdened and congested and has ceased to be an efficient assembly, lies very near the root of popular impatience and indifference. The record of the last few years, with its blazing proofs of official incompetence, has, I need hardly say, raised alienation to positive and disgusted contempt. The English people have outgrown, perhaps forever, their old innocent and touching faith in the capacity of British Ministers merely because they are British Ministers. They are demanding, almost for the first time in their history, something like a fair return for their money. They feel the need of a higher standard of administration, and they are conscious that Parliament grows yearly less competent to provide it.

Nor is this all. The difference between the outside and the inside view of things political is always great. In England, it is perhaps greater than in any other country. But in this matter of the authority, efficiency and repute of Parliament, I note a most unusual approximation between the views of the average M. P. and the views of the average elector. I have heard in the lobbies of the House of Commons expressions of weariness and discontent at least as whole-hearted as any that are uttered by the man in the street. The more earnest a Member of Parliament is, the more quickly does he become convinced that of all reforms the reform of Parliament is the most urgent. The rights and opportunities of the private member have been almost ex-

tinguished. The Cabinet grows yearly more and more autocratic and the House of Commons more and more subservient. The last eighteen months have abundantly shown that the only question which interests the country can, by a skilful use of Parliamentary forms, be almost denied discussion by the people's representatives. The less crowded times when a measure could be debated clause by clause, almost sentence by sentence, have completely passed by. Nowadays, the closure is automatically applied at the discretion of the Government, whole clauses are voted *en bloc* without debate, and from a deliberative assembly the House is relapsing more and more into an assembly that merely ratifies and registers the decrees of the inner Cabinet. From the point of view of achievement, of the possibility of getting things done, the private member to-day is nothing and the Cabinet Minister, if he belongs to that little group which really constitutes a Cabinet-within-the-Cabinet, everything. I see no way out of the toils, unless and until Parliament relieves itself of the vast masses of purely local business that still encumber its workings, and delegates Irish questions to Ireland, Welsh to Wales and Scotch to Scotland. For matters to continue as they now are must ultimately mean the extinction of Parliamentary government of the old type and the substitution for it of Cabinet Government.

Nevertheless, as I began by saying, the House can still make its attractiveness felt as an arena of passionate personal contention; and, at times when political feeling runs high, it is still able to command the thoughts and interest of the British nation. Such a time is the present. The session that opened on February 14th could only be regarded with indifference by a people that had ceased to concern itself in politics. The mere fact that the reassembling of Parliament found Mr. Balfour's Government still in being is, in itself, one of the wonders of politics. By what desperately dexterous mystifications he has contrived to maintain a Ministry that for eighteen months has been without a majority in the country, observers in America are probably as well aware as we in England. It is at least a tribute to his mastery of the art of political legerdemain that people should be asking to-day the very questions they were asking in 1903. Is Mr. Balfour for or against Mr. Chamberlain? Is his policy of Retaliation a stepping-stone to Protection and Colonial Preference, or something complete in itself, or intended as a shelter in which Free-Traders

may take cover until the storm has blown by? Every possible variety of reply is returned to these queries by Free-Traders, Protectionists and Retaliationists, just as a dozen men will, with equal positiveness, give a dozen different versions of the personal and political relations that exist between Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain. And such matters but touch the fringe of the vast area of speculation that lies open to every Englishman who takes the trouble to read the newspaper. Mr. Chamberlain, for instance, has let it be known that he favors an early dissolution. His command of two hundred members of the Unionist party gives him the power to force a dissolution at any moment of his own choosing. But dare he use it? Would it be policy to risk the bitterness that would infallibly ensue from any attempt to supplant Mr. Balfour, or to compel him to dissolve against his own wishes? On the other hand, can he agree to an indefinite postponement of a dissolution without a virtual confession that his Fiscal programme has failed?

Such are but a few of the problems that are agitating, not merely the quidnuncs, but men who are usually the most far-seeing of observers; and, after canvassing opinions on many sides, I find myself forced back on the unsatisfactory conclusion that nobody really knows anything. It is just this ignorance as to which, out of a score of possible developments, will be the one to take place, that gives to the present session its peculiar interest. People are prepared for anything. They are prepared for a dissolution next month and for one next year. A final rupture between Mr. Balfour and the Unionist Free-Traders; a final rupture between Mr. Balfour and the Unionist Protectionists; so prolonged and persistent a battering by the Opposition as will make further escape from dissolution impossible; a continuation of the present state of affairs, with each section of the Unionist party claiming Mr. Balfour as its own, with the Government losing by-election after by-election, yet still maintaining a sufficient majority in the House and still able to frame and to pass important measures;—not one of these developments is impossible. There are those who think, not without reason, that the Government will be out in a few weeks, and there are those who are confident it cannot survive the Budget, which falls due in April; but I do not think any one would be greatly amazed if a year hence the position proves not to have changed in any-

thing but the unessentials. There would be, perhaps, surprise, but it would easily stop short of amazement—so flattering an opinion have people come to form of Mr. Balfour's resource in evading pursuit. I do not underrate his difficulties. He has to face an Opposition that is determined to force the fighting, and that is inspired by the consciousness of having popular instincts and the popular judgment wholly on its side. He has to keep up to the mark some seventy Unionist Members of Parliament, who, for one reason or another, are not seeking reelection, and whose attendance and interest in the affairs of the party only clear and strong leadership could prevent from being intermittent. He has still at any cost to avoid a decisive break, either with the Free-Traders or the Protectionists. He has to beat down the knowledge that he is fighting a losing battle, and that the appeal to the country can only end in his overthrow. Nor is this the limit of the Balfourian sea of troubles. Mr. Arnold-Forster, earnest and energetic though he is, has not shown himself to be the War Minister that we all hoped he might prove. His latest scheme of Army Reorganization appears to be very little of an improvement on those famous Six Army Corps which Mr. Brodrick called into phantom being. There is a battle-royal in progress among the experts as to the merits or demerits of the new Army rifle; and on both these points Mr. Balfour, before the session closes, possibly before these lines are in print, will have to meet the attack of his own followers. Again, the Unionists in Ireland are profoundly dissatisfied. They cannot reconcile themselves to their new position of isolation and abandonment. They complain bitterly that Ireland is being governed in accordance with Irish, instead of English, ideas, and that the Under-Secretary, Sir Anthony MacDonell, a Catholic and a Home-Ruler, is really playing the Nationalist game under the protection of a Unionist administration. They, too, will prove a thorn in Mr. Balfour's side. It seems incredible that he should emerge unscathed from such a concentration of onsets and difficulties. But I do not expect that he will yield easily. He is a Scotchman, and therefore a fighter, and therefore never more dangerous than when he has his back to the wall.

Anglo-German relations are to-day, as they have been for the past ten years, disquieting and unsatisfactory. How much so, may be judged from the recent "scare" over Mr. Arthur Lee's

speech. Mr. Lee is a Civil Lord of the Admiralty and an excellent type of the men who will yet reorganize English administration—efficient, hard-working, large-minded. In a speech to his constituents some days ago, Mr. Lee was reported to have said that, “if war should unhappily be declared under existing conditions, the British Navy would get its blow in first, before the other side had time even to read in the papers that war had been declared”; and he prefaced these words with a statement that Great Britain has now “to keep an anxious eye, not only on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, but on the North Sea.” Mr. Lee has denied that he ever said anything about the British Navy getting its blow in first, and has maintained with perfect truth that the rest of his statement amounted to no more than a general statement of self-evident principles and of facts that had already been published to the world when the redistribution of the British Navy took place. The alarm, however, in Berlin was intense. The German Emperor sent for Sir Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador, and asked for explanations. Sir Frank telegraphed to Downing Street for instructions, and was told to tender the most ample assurances. There can be no doubt that both popular and official Germany thought, and probably still thinks, that Great Britain may one day plan and carry out a sudden and secret onslaught upon the German Navy. Writing for an American audience, which knows something of British character, history and policy, I need hardly take the trouble to expose the preposterous baselessness of such a notion. On the English side, there is an equally firm conviction that, were the British Navy in difficulties, the neutrality of Germany could not be counted on; and there were certain incidents connected with the North Sea outrage and the sudden withdrawal of large German deposits in the Bank of England that lent undoubted color to the conviction. All cannot be said to be well between two Powers when each believes that the other is only waiting for its opportunity.

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ST. PETERSBURG, *February, 1905.*

It is only the unexpected that happens in Russia at present; and, before the observer has time to gauge its significance, it has generally been followed and sometimes outdone by something more unexpected still. A vortex of amazing changes wearies the

eye and blunts the understanding. To write seasonably, therefore, of current events in Muscovy, one should be a special correspondent or an inspired seer recording one's impressions in urgent telegrams or genuine prophecies. The mere chronicler, however satisfactorily he may "shoot folly as it flies," is left far behind by the swift whirl of events, between which one often misses every trace of a causal nexus. Seemingly, motives have no time to act upon men whom impulse urges forward or drags backward irresistibly. What happens to-day is not the sequel to the occurrences of yesterday, and affords no clue to what will surely take place to-morrow. There is no coherence in things, there is no union among persons, there is no centre, no head, no guiding brain: autocratic rule is become anarchy. The Tsar issues a manifesto or a ukase which promises reforms. The people grumble because the concessions he makes are too slight; but they never doubt that they are real. Indeed, the grudging way in which he doles them out is held to be proof sufficient that they will be realized. And yet the Government, by its deliberate acts, laughs to scorn the Tsar's confession that caprice is supreme and his resolve to set law and justice in its place. For example, Nicholas II had said in his ukase that the mission of the press was to make known to the ruler the needs of the people, and that it would therefore enjoy a corresponding degree of liberty. But, far from relaxing their iron grip, the censors tightened it. Some newspapers were wholly suppressed, others suspended, very many punished. The most "harmless" daily paper or review has now to perform a whole series of rites and ceremonies before it can publish even the simplest illustration. The picture must be sent for authorization to (1) the general censorship; (2) the military censors; (3) the court censors; (4) the ecclesiastical censorship; (5) the department of non-orthodox religious confessions; (6) the chancellery of the Governor-General; (7) the chancellery of the police Prefect; (8) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If it passes through all these ordeals unscathed and has not lost its charm of novelty in the waiting, it may be set before the general public, which is obviously unfitted to read articles or see illustrations which the censors can peruse and admire with impunity. And, to crown and summarize this whole system of muzzling, the Emperor's own ukase was suppressed by some Governors in the interior, and the attempts to make it public were for a time thwarted! Instead of



resenting this, however, the Emperor approved it; and, to everybody's amazement, a ministerial circular, issued by the express order of the Tsar, destroyed with a few strokes of the pen the slender hopes of the people, and explained away his own clearly worded statements and definite promises of a few days before.

But the most striking contrast between promise and achievement was offered by the blood-bath of Sunday the 22nd January, known as "Vladimir's Day" because the Grand-Duke of that name was then in command of the "active" troops. The shooting down of unarmed workmen, which there was nothing to excuse, was the first solemn act of the Imperial Government after the Tsar had written that the desire of his heart was to do away with official caprice and establish the reign of law. Over 100,000 workmen, accompanied in many cases by their wives and children, resolved to repair to the square in front of the Winter Palace to petition their "Little Father" the Tsar. Their object was to secure his sympathy and help in their distress, for they had been rebuffed by the bureaucracy; their means were a written petition containing a list of their needs; trust and loyalty marked their disposition. To bring out the peaceful character of the demonstration in still sharper relief, they arranged to march in procession headed by a priest in his vestments and preceded by men bearing crosses and portraits of Nicholas II. They virtually said to their Emperor: "There is no ruler in Russia but you. Hitherto your will has been law even when you willed that hundreds of thousands of your people should perish in Manchuria. Let it now become law in order that we, millions of the men who are the pillars of your empire, should live in Russia. We still believe in you, because we hold that, if you once know the facts, your kindly nature will prompt you to act upon them. And we know that our hope will be fulfilled."

The Tsar, all his advisers, and practically all Russia and the world knew beforehand of the workmen's intention. The educated classes of the capital besought the Ministers to induce the Emperor to receive his people and to keep the troops within-doors on the Sunday. But the Ministers had no eyes or ears for symptoms or advice. One pleaded that it was not his province to interfere; another that he could do nothing because measures had already been devised by the Government and would be taken when the time came. A third refused to receive the deputations.

Nobody could be found in St. Petersburg who could or would admit that he had any voice in the matter. In a word, there was no Government; no head, no Tsar, nothing but anarchy.

When on the morrow the sun rose on hundreds of thousands of workingmen making their slow pilgrimage from the outskirts of the city to the Winter Palace, it shone on a strong military government and upon hundreds of tsarlets. Grand-Duke Vladimir was the supreme commander, and he had appointed Prince Vassiltchikoff to be his factotum. There was no hesitation now, no shilly-shallying or shirking of responsibility. Every one knew his business thoroughly, for it was limited to the shedding of blood. And before they even suspected that their road would be barred, the peaceful people were shot down like mad dogs. No attempt had been first made to disperse them—which a few hundred policemen could have easily done, even without truncheons; in many cases no order was given them to turn back, so that the first intimation they had of what was coming was the blood that dyed the crisp white snow and the moans and shrieks of their comrades that broke upon the Sabbath stillness. The soul-chilling scenes that followed have been hastily described in newspapers; they deserve to be epically depicted in a latter-day Inferno, for they brought back the worst days of mediæval cruelty and heathen heartlessness. Women with child were found among the slain. Babies in their mothers' arms had their brains blown out; passers-by who were hurrying away were pursued, overtaken and hewn to pieces. Fleeing lads were followed into houses, caught on the third or fourth story and shot through the heart. "We must give them a lesson," the Grand-Duke had said. And it was duly given!

The dead were hidden away in hospitals, police stations, the fortress, anywhere; and orders were given to withhold their names. Funerals were announced for the morning, but the bodies were buried hastily at dead of night, and the relatives of the "deceased" are still uncertain whether the missing kindred are living or dead. A journalist who was passing near a crowd was thus shot, snatched away and put under ground. His young wife discovered an unburied coffin with his name on it, and, having got the lid raised by the authorities, found the corpse of another lad inside. Subscriptions for the widows and orphans of the victims could not be collected. It was forbidden to all

and sundry to manifest sympathy or sorrow for the dying or the dead. The newspapers were not allowed to subscribe or receive subscriptions. Money sent from abroad could not be distributed. It was a crime to give or take. Friends who met at night in private houses to discuss the events of the day found themselves surrounded by the police, who raided their dwellings and searched for money and treasonable documents. "Revolution" some people had fondly called the movement. But it was not a revolt, not even a riot, nothing but a "wholesome lesson" administered by Autocracy to the mutinous classes who never know when they ought to feel satisfied. In such terms the official press commented on the events of those historic days. But revolutions have often had smaller beginnings than the episodes that characterized the Sunday of January 22nd on the banks of the ice-bound Neva. Russia was and is in revolution.

The outside world was horrified. A cry of indignation arose from Paris to Peru, from Tokio to Rome. The Autocracy was declared, even by its foreign friends, to have lost its *raison d'être*, and the Russian dignitaries who on parade days in the Winter Palace constitute the Government of the Empire, heard the foreign groans and hisses and trembled. The Grand-Ducal band remained indoors, and not always in their own palaces. The windows of the palace of the Grand-Duke Sergius were smashed. Prince Mirsky drafted an imperial ukase creating a Governor-Generalship, appointed General Trepoff to the post with almost dictatorial powers and had it signed by the Tsar. The principal literary men of St. Petersburg were arrested and hidden away in the fortress, among them all the members of the delegation—including Maxim Gorky—who had petitioned the Ministers to hinder the effusion of blood. Ladies and girls were apprehended, insulted, incarcerated. An order was issued to prepare 500 cells in the various houses of detention, and people spoke with bated breath of the Reign of White Terror.

But again the unexpected happened. The Governor-General, whose character fame described as a mixture of cruelty, stupidity and personal courage, played the part of forerunner of the political millennium. He disavowed responsibility for the arrest of the men of letters. Instead of suppressing liberal newspapers, he tolerated articles more outspoken, more provocative, than the strongest that Prince Mirsky had ever allowed, and, stranger

still, he sent for and cajoled the Liberals, beseeching them to possess their souls in patience for a few days, after the lapse of which he could promise them a new era. The writers, journalists and professors who were interned in the fortress were set free, first one then another, and the cobwebs were allowed to cover the corners of the 500 newly prepared cells. The workmen, too, were received by the Emperor—some threescore of the trustiest and most loyal “hands” for whose good conduct the principal employers of labor could vouch. And, even then, the operatives were not informed that they would be taken to see the Tsar. At first, they were conducted to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, where the Emperor was not residing, and then to Tsarskoye Selo, where he pronounced a discourse in which bitter and sweet were curiously mixed. He rebuked their comrades for allowing themselves to be “duped,” and declared that he and not the deceitful Liberal party was the workman’s friend. The thirty-three operators went home revolving in their minds the things they had seen. The Tsar also assigned 50,000 roubles to the widows and orphans of the people killed by his soldiers, whereupon his humanity and sympathy with human suffering were praised. But, the very day before, that same humanity and sympathy with human suffering displayed by the Tsar’s subjects were condemned by the Tsar’s officials as crimes against the State. Even morality in Russia is reeling and unsteady.

Sunday’s massacre has been regarded as a triumph for the cause of Autocracy. In reality, the crackling of the soldiers’ rifles was its death knell. Never again will the relations between the Tsar and the people be as before. As Father Gapon put it: “There is no longer a Tsar.” The theory of the Little Father and his devoted people is exploded. There is now but a Russian Nation seeking to better its lot, as the workers of St. Petersburg sought to improve theirs, and the only obstacle they encounter is the Tsar. All Russia has besought him to step aside and allow the people to participate in the government of their country, and many of his best friends, like the Zemstvos, have warned him of the danger of refusing. Several hundreds of professors and academicians in St. Petersburg, representatives of the intellect of Russia, have petitioned him in firm language to grant a constitution. The legal bar of the capitals have put their view on record, that Russia cannot and will not endure the present

anarchy much longer. The Zemsky Assembly of Kharkoff, including the marshals of the nobility and the local noblemen, adopted an address to the Tsar by sixty-six votes against four, in which, congruously with the terms of their oath binding them to communicate to His Majesty everything of interest to himself or the State, they resolved to speak plainly and truly. And this is what they said: "Long years of bureaucratic oppression, violence, arbitrary rule, impoverishment and total disfranchisement of the people, utter violation of the principle of freedom of the person, of thought, of conscience, and of speech, have created a state of things in the Empire which can no longer be endured. These same conditions are bringing down the future storm now pending, of which the first thunderous symptoms are already audible. That tempest is fraught with bloody civil war to our country and with subversion to your throne. Sire, ward off those calamities from the Fatherland before it is too late. . . . Your Majesty, it is not enough to make laws, it is indispensable to see that they are observed, it is indispensable to guarantee to the people its rights, it is indispensable to exercise wakeful vigilance. And no bureaucratic system can accomplish this. Bureaucracy has already forfeited the confidence of the country. Neither is any monarch, however great he may be, able to know everything, to act for all and alone to be responsible before God and the nation for the destinies of his Fatherland. Do not trust, sire, to negligent and wily servants, but repose confidence in the chosen representatives of the nation. Hasten to convoke them to a permanent Chamber endowed with legislative powers, and qualified to see that the laws are not broken, that the Treasury is not robbed, and that the milliards accumulated from the nation's mites are employed suitably and for proper purposes."

From the most out-of-the-way corners of the Empire, similar addresses, petitions, resolutions came in by every post. All thinking Russia joined the opposition and took from the rulers every pretext for affecting ignorance of the state of public feeling and opinion. Government by violence is still possible for a time, but so, too, is opposition by violence—such opposition as put a sudden end to the system of Plehve and Sipyaghin, of Bobrikoff and Johnsson. Force can do much in Russia for and also against the Autocracy, but it cannot make a ruinous system beneficent. You can do anything with bayonets, except sit upon them.

Looking back upon the events of the past few weeks, one is struck with certain features which characterize the revolutionary movement in Russia and differentiate it from analogous movements in all other countries. In the first place, it was not the result of a deliberate plan, not even of a conscious resolve. It was spontaneous, elemental. The ground was so thoroughly prepared by generations of misrule that a general manifestation resulted, as spontaneous combustion does. Every class, every section of society was discontented and had ample grounds for kicking against the pricks. Political electricity was in the air, and it was felt that anything, anywhere, might attract it and unleash the storm. The proximate cause was insignificant in itself. A petty dispute between operatives and employers, in steel-works outside St. Petersburg—a misunderstanding which could have been settled in ten minutes—was the origin. The operatives, strange to say, were all members of an ultra-loyal association, founded by the police as a dam to keep back the Socialist and revolutionary current amongst workingmen. The members of the union were allowed to meet, to make speeches, to have a private theatre, to read books and newspapers, and to count on Government support in disputes with their employers. These were some of the heavy bribes paid for their political loyalty.

The leader of these police myrmidons was an Orthodox Russian priest, George Gapon—a semi-educated, fanatical individual, who is capable of kindling heroic fire in the breasts of the crowd, but is no born leader. He grew, mentally and morally, together with the events of the moment, until he attained the proportions of a popular hero. As a matter of fact, his intellectual and ethical greatness have been enormously exaggerated. In the course of three days, Father Gapon imparted to the economic movement a political tinge. As the authorities had refused to grant the workmen's original demands, alleging that political obstacles stood in the way, Gapon answered: "Then the political obstacles must go." But only to that extent was the demonstration political. Russian men of light and leading in literature, journalism, science and art had no appreciable influence upon the agitation. There was no point of contact between the two groups. Even among the "Intellectuals" themselves, there was no unity, no organization, no plan. They sat and talked, and did nothing but prove to the world their utter inexperience in

matters political. Among them all, there was not one leader. The authorities are said to have suspected a number of them forming a Provisional Government. They might as well accuse them of hatching a plot to introduce the religion of ancient Egypt among the subjects of the Tsar. It was pathetic to look upon their helplessness.

The whole movement, then, was spontaneous, peaceful, loyal. A clever minister would have utilized it to prop up the Autocracy. But the authorities in St. Petersburg had it arrested by measures which history will classify with those taken at Blagoveshtshensk and Kishineff. Then the population of Russia openly sympathized with the strikers, and in most of the chief towns struck work or actually took up arms,—as in Riga, Warsaw and elsewhere—against the Autocracy. Even Witte, the ex-Finance Minister, who is charged with realizing the reforms outlined in the Imperial ukase of December, is reported to have exclaimed that in St. Petersburg, on January 22nd, “A crime was committed which neither God nor the nation will ever forgive.”

But the Autocrat is still unconvinced. He may, probably will, grant a Zemsky Sobor or Assembly of Notables. But he will not consent to the introduction of constitutional government or the curtailment of his unlimited power. And, so long as he persists in that resolve, Russia will be in revolution. If his rule be upheld by open violence, the opposition of his people will be conducted by secret violence; and the historic happenings of the near future are certain to be direct resultants of the meeting and clashing of these two forces.

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BERLIN, February, 1905.

THE most significant result of the gigantic strike of colliers in Westphalia is, undoubtedly, the impetus it has given to the movement for the nationalization of the coal-supply. Prussia, as all the world knows, is the classic land of State Socialism. Its Government administers the complicated machinery of the Insurance Laws, superintends the management of immense forests and landed estates, and is one of the largest employers of industrial labor in Europe. All the railways in Prussia are the property of the State, which works them with a single eye to the promotion of the national interests. If there is no rate-cutting in

Prussia, there is, on the other hand, no discrimination and no undue raising of freight charges. The railways, in fact, have been converted into the handmaid of the manufacturing industries, which have profited enormously, both in their home and in their foreign trade, from the scientific regulation of the transport tariffs by a paternal government. Moreover, the surpluses yielded by the railways have contributed materially to lighten the burden of taxation. The advantages of the system are accompanied, of course, by many drawbacks; but, on the whole, the experiment begun by Bismarck has proved a decided success. If a plebiscite could be held on the subject to-day, it would be found that the conception of the railways as a State enterprise has become part and parcel of the national consciousness, and that the idea of a reversion to the principle of private ownership would be distasteful to the multitude. Yet, there has been no widely expressed desire that the State should seek systematically to extend its duties as an employer of labor. Despite the arguments of the Katheder Socialists, who from their professorial armchairs have frequently preached the doctrine of the State-ownership of mines, a deep-rooted aversion has prevailed against the assumption by the Government of responsibilities which would entail the addition of fresh brigades to the already vast host of those who look to the State as the source of their well-being. The change which is now coming over the feelings of the educated classes and the attitude of the Government is a direct consequence of the extreme views enunciated and enforced by the coal magnates themselves. Obviously, the State cannot tolerate the establishment of a private monopoly in coal. It requires coal for its railways, for its navy, and for its army. When, therefore, the Westphalian pit-owners constituted themselves into a vast syndicate, thereby depriving the entire industry of the benefits accruing from individual ownership and competition, the Government endeavored to enter into a compromise with them. It proposed to become a member of the syndicate, and to exercise at least an advisory voice in its affairs. The Government did not, it is true, take the coal-owners into its confidence, but began secretly to purchase shares in the "Hibernia Company," which is one of the biggest partners in the combine. The manoeuvre was naturally detected, and the coal-owners declared with one accord that they refused to admit the Government to their ranks. A special meeting of the shareholders



of the "Hibernia" was summoned and its assent obtained to the issue of new and quite superfluous stock, which the Directors reserved for themselves, thus preventing the Government from obtaining a majority of shares. The Directors based their action on the argument that the policy of the authorities was to insert the thin end of the wedge of nationalization into the coal industry. They affirmed that they must remain the sole arbiters of their own property.

And, just as the controllers of the syndicate rejected the co-operation in their enterprise of the Government, so, on the other hand, are they determined to tolerate no interference from the trade-unions. Their contract, they affirm, is with the individual workman and not with a coalition of workmen. In other words, their determination is to deny to the working-man the right of combination which they themselves have exploited to its fullest extent. A similar attitude on the part of the pit-owners was the main reason of the general strike of 1890. The Emperor William then embraced the cause of the men. He received a deputation of their leaders, and informed the masters that their refusal to negotiate with the delegates appointed by the colliers was unjustifiable. The dispute was eventually settled, and the coal trade of Germany—the finest barometer of its industrial prosperity—expanded by leaps and bounds. In the course of ten years it doubled its output. To-day, two hundred and seventy thousand colliers are employed in Westphalia, whereas in 1890 the number was not more than one hundred and twenty thousand. The profits secured by the majority of the pits have been enormous, but there has been no corresponding increase of wages; and, in many cases, the men have been treated with a cynical brutality which goes far to explain the growing insistence of the cry for Government intervention. Only last year, the owners arbitrarily closed several pits which had been worked for generations, and around which the pitmen had built their own dwelling-houses. Thousands of men were thus deprived of their homes and sent wandering in search of other work. Not for one moment was it contended that the pits which were closed had been exhausted; but, in pursuance of the syndicate policy, which is to regulate the output, it was deemed advisable to transfer the amount of production allotted to those mines to larger mines, and in this way to effect a saving in the total working expenses. Of compen-

sation to the colliers, whose house property was deprived of its value by the measure, not a word has been heard; but it is not improbable that the Government will now introduce legislation designed to limit the right of owners to close their mines. The contention publicly advanced by the mine-owners, "We can do what we like with our own property," cannot, it is felt, be allowed to pass unchallenged by the State. It was in the spirit of that contention that the Directors of the Bruchstrasse pit, about the beginning of the new year, ordained the extension of the time to be spent by the men underground. The illegality of the order being obvious, it was withdrawn, but only to reappear shortly afterwards in another form. The men were touched on the quick of their grievances. For years they have complained of the loss of their "inherited right to an eight hours' working-day." At present, they work nine and often ten hours underground, and the tendency, unhappily, is not to reduce but still further to increase, by means of extra shifts, the duration of their daily employment.

Here we touch upon a vital point of difference between masters and men. The men contend that their duties actually begin when they enter the shaft. They point out that the exertion entailed by the long journey along dark and narrow passages, to and from the face of the seam, is quite as exhausting as the process of cutting the coal. And as the shafts grow deeper and the number of colliers employed more numerous, so does the time expended in this operation tend to extend. But the masters, far from admitting the justice of the views thus enunciated, have given the colliers to understand that they must expect in future an even greater measure of severity. That was the meaning of the proclamation posted up in the Bruchstrasse pit announcing that the "*Seilfahrt*," or passage up and down the lift, would, after the first of February, occupy from half to three-quarters of an hour longer than has hitherto been the case. No sooner had that notice appeared than the colliers began to strike. The trade-union leaders, who are credibly reported to have planned a general strike for the spring, seemed powerless to stay the movement. Within a week, nearly seventy thousand men had ceased to work. Confronted by this situation the trade-unions—both Social Democratic and Christian—decided to formulate their demands. They did so in the humblest manner. Their communication to the Mine-

Owners' Union, like the memorable despatch of the Japanese Government to St. Petersburg, may have been an ultimatum in substance, it was far from being one in form. All that the trade-unions requested, with the "most devoted" expressions of their respect, was that the masters would assent to a conference for the discussion of the points of difference. The men demanded, they explained, the establishment of a maximum shift of eight hours, including the operation of ascent and descent, but they were willing to continue their labors this year on the basis of a nine hours' shift, if the masters would consent to reduce it next year to eight and a half hours, and in 1907 to eight hours. They further required the abolition of overtime and Sunday labor, excepting for the purpose of rescuing human life or of effecting extraordinary repairs. The third demand of the men had reference to the practice of withholding payment for all trolleys which are found to contain dross as well as coal. It was argued that, in the dim light and in the haste which prevails at the face of the mines, it is often impossible for the workmen to distinguish stone from coal, and that it is only just that they should be paid for the actual amount of coal obtained by them. Finally, the trade-unions put forth on behalf of their members the demand for humane treatment of the colliers by the officials, punishment of any officials who are convicted of abusing or maltreating the men under their supervision, and recognition by the mine-owners of the organizations formed by the men for the protection of their interests.

The reply of the Mine-Owners' Association to the trade-unions was conceived in the spirit of an address by the Russian Emperor to his misguided subjects. The association adopted the standpoint that the colliers had been guilty of illegal conduct in leaving their work without giving due notice of their intention so to do. With men who had broken their contract, the masters could not negotiate. To do so would be equivalent to countenancing their breach of faith. Equally impossible was it for the masters to recognize anything in the shape of trade-unions or workmen's committees. "Our contract," they said, "is with the individual working-man, and accordingly we can only negotiate with the working-man individually. The demand that recognition shall be accorded to the trade-unions is merely designed to promote the interests of the Social Democratic party, which aims at the sub-

version of the existing order of society." The autocratic attitude of the masters was followed on January 18th by the proclamation of a general strike. The proclamation was obeyed by not quite two hundred thousand of the men. The Government, animated by the desire to rescue German industry from the evils of a prolonged and embittered conflict, at once despatched to the centre of the coal district commissioners charged with the task of bringing about a reconciliation between pit-owners and pitmen. It soon appeared, however, that the owners were not amenable to mediation on the part of the Government. They refused even to attend a conference with the representatives of the men to be presided over by the Government commissioner. The men, they said, must return to their work unconditionally or not at all. Words and actions of the owners in fact gave color to the suggestion that, foreseeing the inevitability of a conflict, they had deliberately provoked it at a moment most unfavorable to the prospects of the workers. Unfortunately for themselves, they overstrained the patience of the Government, already considerably irritated by the "Hibernia" controversy. Though at first disposed to re-echo the cry that the strike was the result of Social Democratic agitation, the Government discovered, before a week had elapsed, that the country expected it to intervene, and not merely to mediate, in favor of the colliers. Public opinion, indeed, had worked itself up to a high pitch of indignation against the masters and their claim to dispose as autocrats of their own "property." Even the Roman Catholic Archbishop saw himself constrained to contribute to the strikers' funds. His contribution brought dozens in its train. But, though the funds of the trade-unions swelled gratifyingly, it was generally foreseen that, without Government intervention, their cause was lost; for, as soon as the strikers had exhausted their wages and savings, a sum of more than three millions of marks weekly would be required to keep them and their families from starvation.

The initial rebuff to the masters was administered by the Prussian Minister of Commerce, Herr Möller, who, from his seat in the Reichstag, officially censured them for their uncompromising attitude. The Minister further improved the occasion by testifying that the strikers were innocent of the charges brought against them by the masters, of terrorizing those working-men "who are willing to work." A few days after the delivery of this reprimand

mand of the pit-owners, the Government announced that it had decided upon the introduction of legislation designed to remedy the complaints of the strikers. The new Bill, it was explained, would render it impossible for the masters to extend in an arbitrary fashion the time occupied in conveying the men to and from the mines. It would prohibit the system of withholding payment for trolleys of coal containing dross, and restrict the rights of the managers of pits to order extra shifts. Various other grievances advanced by the men, the Government announced, would also be remedied by the Bill. In view of these measures, it is already possible to say that the strike has been successful.

Viewed in the light of history, it may be said that the relations between the Governments of Russia and Prussia reveal in fact nothing more nor less than the existence of a Mutual Insurance Agreement against the effects of Revolutions and Insurrections. It was, therefore, not without a certain symbolical significance that the German Emperor, two years ago, should have addressed to the Prussian Regiment of his Russian brother those impetuous references, which aroused much excited comment at the time, to the duties of soldiers who are called upon to annihilate the "internal enemy." Equally suggestive is the fact that when, in the autumn of 1903, His Majesty considered it incumbent upon himself to exhibit the strength of his army in Posen, the capital of his Polish Province, he invited to the festivities as his most honored guest General Tscherkoff, the Governor of Warsaw. The object of that invitation was, of course, to demonstrate to the Poles the completeness of the agreement subsisting between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin. That agreement was never more cordial than at the present moment, and for this reason, quite apart from contingent possibilities, the sanguinary scenes which are now passing in Russian Poland, as well as in other parts of the Muscovite Empire, are being followed in Berlin with a peculiar intensity of interest. Already, the spokesmen of the German governing classes are identifying themselves, as far as political morals are concerned, with the line of action taken by the St. Petersburg dictators. The mob of January 22nd, they declare, was entirely in the wrong, and the State would have been lost irretrievably if it had shrunk from employing "grape-shot"—Napoleon's unfailing remedy—for the beneficent purpose of correcting the people's perverted sense of perspective. And, in

consonance with this doctrine, the troops in Berlin have been instructed afresh, in the words of the Emperor William's celebrated address of 1891 to his Potsdam recruits, that if—"which God forbid!"—disturbances, similar to those in Russia, should ever occur in Germany, it would be their immediate and sacred duty to make effective use of their weapons in the work of suppression. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, are proclaiming that, "if" they could now give substance and a form to their ideal State of the Future, they would mobilize its armies and with them cross the border in order to aid in rescuing their Russian comrades from the autocratic yoke.

Meanwhile, it is felt, the functions of a good neighbor, which Germany notoriously aspires to be, must be confined to the task of keeping order on the border, and of preventing, so far as possible, the construction in neutral territory of political mines designed to explode with devastating effect beneath the feet of those who represent the existing Russian régime. From this point of view, it is deemed justifiable to impose arbitrary restrictions on the liberty of Russian subjects to establish themselves in German territory, and to admit Russian police spies to positions of authority in the Empire, in order that they may control the actions of those of their compatriots whom it may not be convenient, without definite and positive information, to expel. Within the last few months, a Russian Department has been added to the organization of the Berlin Police—so rapidly has the scope for such work, by the growing indulgence of the Government, been allowed to expand. To the indignant protests of the representatives of the more liberal schools of German thought, who describe such institutions as a prostitution of authority, a deaf ear is turned; for does not the work of Russian spies in Prussian territory come within the terms of the Mutual Insurance Agreement? Moreover, it is argued, the unrestricted importation into Russian territory of revolutionary schemes of organization would tend to weaken still more the existing régime, which just now it is Germany's chief interest to support. For a Russian Empire, debilitated but not exhausted by war, with its centre of gravity shifting ever more to the East, represents to the mind of German statesmanship the ideal of a neighbor; while a Russia, delirious with the fever of revolution, conjures up visions of endless perils, not all of them necessarily associated with Poland.

The German Government has at last succeeded in substituting new commercial treaties for those which were concluded during the Von Caprivi Chancellorship. Count von Bülow is naturally triumphant. He owes his victory to the defeats suffered by Russia in the battle-fields of Manchuria; for it is an admitted fact that, if she had not been in pressing need of financial assistance, Russia would never have consented to swallow the German minimum tariff on cereals. After Russia had capitulated to the terms dictated from Berlin, Austria-Hungary had no alternative but to follow suit; but she did so with intense reluctance and with much vain kicking against the pricks. The new treaties, which will come into operation eleven months hence, inaugurate an era of greatly increased protection in Europe. From the specifically German point of view, their admitted object is to foster the interests of agriculture. Germany, General von Caprivi announced twelve years ago, has become a manufacturing state. For that "discovery" and for the "act of salvation" represented by his commercial treaties, the General was elevated to the dignity of Count by a grateful Emperor. But no Chancellor can hope to retain power in permanent opposition to the landed aristocracy of Prussia; and the simple soldier "without corn or straw" soon lost the favor of his monarch. The historical "act of salvation" has now been crowned by Count von Bülow—with an extinguisher! Germany, says the present Chancellor, is not merely an industrial community; her preeminent interests are agricultural. Accordingly, in his new treaties he has subordinated the demands of the manufacturing industries to those of the Agrarians. The economical theory on which he bases and justifies this policy is the protection of the home market, which, it is argued, is relatively of infinitely greater importance than any foreign market. Great Britain is quoted in this argument as the warning example. She is losing her ascendancy as a manufacturing Power, the German economists contend, because of the inadequacy of her home demand. It is true that she has gained a few millions of colonial customers in the course of the free-trade era; but she has at the same time lost millions of agricultural workers, who, if they had been encouraged by a wise system of protection to remain on the land, would to-day represent a body of consumers, considerably higher in value to the manufacturing industries of the United Kingdom than the largest British colony.

WASHINGTON, *February, 1905.*

THE incidents of interest from the view-point of world-politics which have taken place at Washington during the last thirty days are; first, the passage, by an overwhelming majority, of the Esch-Townsend bill reported to the House of Representatives, the bill empowering the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix provisionally under certain circumstances the railway rates for transportation, which rates, however, are subject to review by a newly created Federal tribunal; secondly, the relation provisionally assumed by the United States Executive toward the Dominican Republic; and, lastly, the Senate's practical rejection of six arbitration treaties concluded with European Powers, through its imposition of an amendment which our State Department, very properly, has declined to submit to the other parties to the contracts. As we have formerly mentioned, foreign countries are concerned in the fate of the Esch-Townsend bill, because, if it becomes a law, the measure will enable the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix the rates chargeable for the conveyance of imported articles from the ports of entry to points in the interior of the great American Republic. There is no doubt that American railway companies, viewed collectively, were much opposed to the Esch-Townsend bill; and, assuredly, they had reason to suppose that they had a good many friends in the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, that body was stampeded by the President's popularity; and, when the decisive vote was taken, the champions of the railways were few and far between. Was it possible that even the Senate, which long has been regarded as the stronghold of railway and other corporate interests, could withstand such a tidal wave of sentiment? That was the question which the "Big Four," as the steerers in the Republican majority of the Senate are called, had to ponder over. Was it practicable, they asked each other, to undermine the President's popularity, and sap his reputation for good judgment, so that the Senate might throw out, or postpone indefinitely, the Esch-Townsend bill, without provoking a storm of popular opprobrium? Was it not possible to represent recent Santo Domingo incidents as proofs that President Roosevelt could not safely be entrusted with the power to conclude, without the express ratification of the Senate, special agreements with foreign countries; and, on the strength of such representation, to nullify



the six general arbitration treaties concluded with European Powers, by inserting an amendment to the effect that each special agreement made by our State Department under them must be ratified by the Senate, as if it were a separate treaty? The Senatorial friends of the railways seem to have made up their minds that, in this way, they could so effectually discredit Mr. Roosevelt that their subsequent opposition to his railway-rate bill—the Esch-Townsend bill is virtually his—would be tolerated by the people. Accordingly, they persuaded the Senate to insert by a majority of 50 to 9, in the six general arbitration treaties, an amendment which gutted them of all practical utility, and which our Secretary of State would no more think of proposing to European Powers than he would dream of offering them gold bricks. For what was it that the general arbitration treaties undertook to do? They simply undertook to define with the utmost carefulness and rigor certain categories of international differences, which our State Department should be at liberty by special agreement to refer to arbitration, without incurring the prolonged delay involved in the submission of each particular case to the ratification of the Senate. The treaties simply assumed that the Senate had a right to ratify a compact relating to a specific class of controversies, just as a legislature has a right to make a law prescribing the penalty for a particular category of offences. We venture to predict that the United States Supreme Court would uphold the right of the Senate, under the second clause of the second section of the second Article of the Federal Constitution, to define beforehand a class of international differences any one of which the State Department might be authorized to refer by special agreement to arbitration. This was all that Secretary Hay assumed to do in the six arbitration treaties which the Senate has rejected in their original form, on the plea that their constitutional duty compels them to regard each special agreement concluded under a general arbitration compact as a separate treaty.

There is a widespread and growing conviction among intelligent Americans that, viewed as a matter of abstract law, the Senate's contention is unfounded; and that, even if the plea be technically valid, it is put forward very late, and is prompted, seemingly, by questionable motives. It has taken the Senate fifty-six years to discover that it cannot permit the Executive to apply by a

special agreement, unsanctioned specifically by the Senate, a general arbitration treaty. The Treaty of Guadeloupe-Hidalgo, concluded with Mexico in 1848, contained an arbitration clause even broader than the provisions embodied in the six univocal arbitration treaties negotiated by Secretary Hay. Will it be alleged that a body including, as it did, such men as Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay and Thomas H. Benton, was not competent to discern and proclaim the Senate's constitutional rights and duties? Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Senate, as at present constituted, is better qualified than it was fifty-six years ago to interpret the second clause of the second section of the second Article of the Federal Constitution, how are we to explain the fact that it made no protest when, two or three years ago, our State Department, acting under the arbitration clause of the Treaty of Guadeloupe-Hidalgo, undertook, by a special agreement with the Mexican Government, to refer the disputed disposition of the so-called California Pious Fund to The Hague Tribunal? The special agreement was known to every one; the arbitration which it authorized took place; an award was made and duly carried out; yet not a word of remonstrance was heard from the Senate, which now shows itself so acutely jealous of its prerogative. Again, in January, 1903, while the Senate was in session, it was a matter of notoriety that our State Department had entered into a "special agreement" with the Executive of the Dominican Republic, whereby the claim of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company of New York against that commonwealth was to be submitted to a board of arbitrators, one of whom was to be an American citizen, and another a Dominican citizen, while the umpire was to be Judge George Gray, of Delaware. The award was rendered in July, 1904; and, in pursuance of it, a fiscal agent appointed by our State Department took charge of the custom-house at Puerto Plata, and has since applied its revenues to the payment of the debt due the American corporation. It will be observed that, during two years, the Senate remained an indifferent spectator of a transaction which, according to the position now assumed by it, constituted a serious infraction of its constitutional rights. We add that the Senate, in the exercise of its treaty-making power, deliberately ratified The Hague Convention, although the very gist of that Convention is that, whenever a

given international difference shall fall under any one of several carefully defined categories, the signatories concerned shall by special agreements refer the difference to The Hague Tribunal.

It seems that Mr. Lodge, of Massachusetts, by way of keeping his fellow Senators in countenance, has prepared a paper in which he undertakes to show that, when the Senate emasculated the six arbitration treaties concluded by our State Department (by insisting upon substituting for "special agreement" the word "treaty"), it did what almost every European Government, based on representative institutions—Great Britain is acknowledged to be an exception—habitually does and must do under its organic law. In other words, neither the French nor any other Continental Parliament will—according to Mr. Lodge—ratify an arbitration treaty concluded by its Executive, except upon the understanding that every separate application of the arbitration principle should be embodied in a distinct treaty, and, as such, ratified in conformity to the organic law's provisions. That is what Mr. Lodge means to say, if he means anything by his memorandum. We can exemplify the value of his elaborate array of pretended parallels and precedents, if we take the case of France. Everybody who ever read the organic law of 1875 is conversant with the terms in which the treaty-making power is defined and regulated. It is not true that all treaties concluded by the French Executive must be submitted to the French Parliament for ratification. The most vital of all treaties in the history of the Third French Republic—the Treaty of Alliance with Russia—has never been so submitted. Only treaties dealing with certain carefully specified classes of subjects require ratification by both Houses of the French Parliament. Even as regards those specified classes, it has never been disputed that the French Parliament has the power, by sanctioning a general treaty of arbitration, to ratify in advance any special agreement entered into by the Executive in pursuance of that treaty. If the French Executive should exceed its authority by transcending the prescribed limitations, it would do so at its own risk. Does Mr. Lodge want chapter and verse for our averments? In the first place, when France became a signatory of The Hague Convention, it agreed, with all the formalities of a treaty, that its Executive should have the power to enter into a special agreement to refer to The Hague Tribunal any international

difference that should fall under any of the categories formulated in that Convention. Subsequently, and very recently, the French Parliament has ratified an arbitration treaty with Great Britain identical with the compacts that our Senate has just rejected, a treaty providing that the French and British Foreign Offices might, by a special agreement, refer to arbitrators any controversy which should belong to any of several specified classes. Secretary Hay, for his part, was aware, because he had taken measures to inform himself, that not one of the six European countries with which he had negotiated arbitration treaties, would experience any difficulty in securing a Parliamentary ratification of those treaties—if such ratification were needed—"special-agreement" clause and all. Nor can there be any doubt that he had made known the fact to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to every member of which he had submitted drafts of the proposed treaties, and had elicited an expression of approval from all of the members except one. This is admitted, and the only excuse offered by the members of the Committee for breaking the promise given to the Secretary is that they did not then fully realize the distinction between a "special agreement" and a "treaty." In other words, they plead the baby act.

What is the actual status of the Santo Domingo affair? It is not true that the original protocol of January 20, however desirable it may have seemed to President Morales of Santo Domingo, and however admirable to the eyes of the amateur diplomatists who framed it, was either authorized in advance, or subsequently accepted, by our State Department. On the contrary, it was repudiated the moment its text was inspected. It has never been acted upon in a single Dominican port. Our representative at the Dominican capital was forthwith instructed to negotiate a new agreement, more in consonance with our Government's intentions; and the substituted compact, having been duly signed by our diplomatic agent and the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs, reached our State Department on February 15, and, together with a special message explaining its purport, was submitted to the Senate that very day. The agreement, which is embodied in a treaty, provides that the United States shall collect the customs revenues of Santo Domingo, and turn over to President Morales's Government 55 per cent. thereof, to meet the cost of the Dominican Republic's

domestic administration, the remaining 45 per cent. being reserved for disbursement among foreign creditors. The United States covenant, on their part, to respect the territorial and political integrity of Santo Domingo; and it is stipulated that the protocol or treaty shall be approved by the Dominican Congress, as well as by the United States Senate. We do not see how Senators can refuse to ratify this compact, except upon the assumption that the Monroe Doctrine does not pledge us to interpose between European creditors and a debtor American commonwealth, by playing the part of a receiver, and undertaking to collect and pay, not only indemnities due for public wrongs, but ordinary debts arising out of contract. Up to the time when we permitted the blockade of Venezuelan seaports by European creditor-Powers, and allowed them to confiscate a part of their debtor's customs revenues for the payment, not only of compensation for wrongs, but also of ordinary debts, our Government might have argued that, to debts arising out of contract, the maxim "*caveat emptor*" should apply, and that we could not permit European Governments to enforce by violence the satisfaction of such obligations by a delinquent American commonwealth. The Roosevelt Administration, however, was estopped from taking such a stand after it remained an impassive spectator of the Venezuela blockade. There was only one possible loophole of escape from the dilemma in which our Government had placed itself. Mr. Roosevelt saw the loophole, and availed himself of it by announcing in the letter read at the Cuban dinner, an announcement now embodied in the agreement with Santo Domingo, that, if any debtor American republic is to be placed in the hands of a receiver, we ourselves will assume the receivership. As Mr. Roosevelt points out in his special message to the Senate, if we are to guarantee the territorial and political integrity of American republics, and if we are to fulfil our promise that their destiny shall in no wise fall under foreign control, it has become indispensable for us to see that just debts and obligations contracted by these republics be paid, so that there may be no pretext for foreign intervention in their affairs. It is for Senators to say whether they prefer to sanction the President's position, or to provoke a repetition of the Venezuela blockade. The United States must take one course or the other. They cannot pursue any longer a dog-in-the-manger policy.